





Goldsmiths College, University of London, UK
Abstract
Habit is an integral concept for body studies, a hybrid concept and one that has
provided the bedrock across the humanities for considering the interrelationships
between movement and stasis, being and becoming, and process and fixity. Habits
are seen to provide relay points between what is taken to be inside and outside,
disrupting any clear and distinct boundary between nature and culture, self and
other, the psychological and social, and even mind and matter. Habit thus discloses
a paradox. It takes up a unique position in affect modulation, which encompasses
both regulation (in the form of discipline) and also extends the body’s potential for
engaging the new, change and creativity. In order to understand the basis of the
ambivalent duality governing understandings of habit it is argued that a genealogical
approach to this question is necessary. This will be located within the recent ‘turn
to affect’ and histories of conation within the psychological sciences, particularly
taking the writings of William McDougall as a focus.
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Reflections on habits have a long lineage, appearing across theological,
philosophical, criminological, literary, psychological and sociological
discourses, and producing something of a paradox in our attempts to














her engagement with what becomes figured as ‘ordinary’ – as the invi-
sible background to experience – habit plays a paradoxical role. Weiss
(2008: 82) enacts this paradox by taking a transdisciplinary archive of
writers and thinkers – literary, philosophical and psychological – who
in different ways have asked, ‘How individual and cultural innovation
can occur within the context of (the) habitual horizons?’
Many of the writers Weiss engages will be very familiar to Body &
Society readers; their understandings of habit have taken up a central
place within body studies. These include the theories and writings of
Merleau-Ponty, Pierre Bourdieu, Gilles Deleuze and William James,
whose engagements with habit have provided scholars interested in
embodimentwith a variety of ways of conceptualizing how social prac-
tices and relations arematerialized. In her critical engagementwith their
diverse accounts, discussed alongside literary accounts of habit such as
those we find in the writings of Marcel Proust, the question of how to
explain innovation, change, creativity and transformation when habits
are often taken to express what is more or evenmost resistant to change
becomes a key challenge and paradox. The ambivalences that are
enacted across her archive consider habits in different ways as both
enhancing and stultifying. As she invites the reader to ponder, ‘Can
habit keep ‘‘an old dog from learning new tricks’’? Or is habit precisely
what provides a necessary foundation for new meanings to emerge?’
(Weiss, 2008: 77). It is this paradox thatwill be the subject ofmyarticle.
The question Weiss raises often divides accounts of habit in which
the ambivalences are produced according to an oppositional series of
dualities, which she argues are often seen to divide key figures of the
19th and 20th centuries. These include a focus on instinct versus
learned behaviour, animal versus the human, nature versus culture
and mechanism versus vitalism. What we see are almost two compet-
ing epistemes, which bring together different assemblages of con-
cepts: genes, neuronal activity, instincts, etc. In the background, at
the level of ontology, we can also find appeals to materialism versus
appeal to some anti-materialist animating principle or process. These
dualities are carried through into the 21st century, particularly within
the neurosciences, where debates about habit often refer to either
conscious versus unconscious thought or action. Arguments within
some neuroscientific accounts attempt to account for consciousness
with reference to neuronal actively alone (see Rose, forthcoming).
However, one of the aims of Weiss’s account of key figures
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associated with habit is to demonstrate that these dualities are not so
clear-cut, particularly when we consider the histories of the debates
that are marshalled by accounts of habit. We can clearly see how a
focus on sedimentation and creativity as mutually constitutive pro-
cesses is central to the histories of accounts of habit that have taken
up a central place within body studies.
The paradox of habit is carried through into more recent work on
affect (see Blackman, 2012; Blackman and Venn, 2010), where habit
takes up a unique position in affect modulation (Massumi, 2002).
This encompasses attention to regulation (in the form of discipline)
and also to how habits extend the body’s potential for engaging the
new, change and creativity (see Clough and Wilse, 2011; Grosz,
2004 and in this volume). As we will see, and as Weiss (2008: 97)
argues, the problem of habit, and the tension between sedimentation
and transformation, is often posed agonistically, with different
accounts prioritizing one or other of habit’s dimensions. This is
rather than posing ‘transformation and sedimentation as mutually
constitutive phenomena’. The importance of this recognition will
be followed through in this article by taking the writings of the
British social psychologist, William McDougall (1871–1938) as a
focus. As we will see, McDougall is often associated with developing
a theory of instincts, placing habit as an important component of the
disciplining of bodies (see Blackman, 2007). However, when we
examine the history of his writings in more detail, we will see that
his work also enacted ideas and concepts more associated with
neo-vitalist traditions within philosophy (see Grosz, in this volume).
This disrupts the idea that psychology was solely mechanistic in its
understandings of habit, which were to underlie important accounts
of why psychology was later to be dismissed by sociological forms
of understanding (see Camic, 1986).
I seek to show how some of the tensions within the affective turn,
particularly those identified in recent interventions by Ruth Leys
(2011; see also Blackman, 2012;Wetherell, 2012), can be traced back
to the ambivalences enacted within McDougall’s writing, which are
characteristic of psychology’s forgotten history (see also Blackman,
2012). The antecedents of the affective turn take us back to the
unexplored connections between psychic research, Lamarckism,
neo-vitalism and eugenics central to McDougall’s work (see Asprem,
2010), and which I shall argue persist in contemporary accounts of
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the affective capacities of bodies. Such histories illustrate habit’s
close relationship to discussions of telepathy, mimesis and instinct,
and bring vitalism much closer to these traditions than has been
acknowledged or explored. What is at stake in this recognition is the
subject of the article.
The Matter of Habit
The heading for this section is taken from a seminal article written by
the American sociologist, Charles Camic (1986). Camic argues that
habit was largely excised from sociology after 1918, and this was
particularly to do with the colonization of habit by forms of beha-
viourist psychology. As Camic stridently puts it, ‘the concept of habit
was a casualty of sociology’s revolt against behaviourism’ (1986:
1040). Within this framing, the institutionalization of sociology was
enacted in relation to psychology and the shaping and forming of its
own disciplinary boundaries and objects. One familiar way in which
this boundary-work was played out is in relation to the French socio-
logical imagination, which privileged Emile Durkheim over his
contemporary, Gabriel Tarde (see Blackman, 2007; Latour, 2002).
Durkheim and Tarde were both interested in imitation and contagious
forms of communication which seemed to by-pass reason. However,
unlike Tarde, Durkheim was hostile to modelling imitation on the
basis of hypnotic suggestibility, preferring instead to see imitation
as a form of social imposition or coercion.
Tarde’s concepts of invention and imitation were derived from his
interest in hypnotic trance, and on the basis of this he argued that
suggestion was the basis of sociality itself (see Blackman, 2007; Can-
dea, 2010). This oscillation between what Ruth Leys (1983: 7) terms
mimesis and anti-mimesis was central to the way in which habit
became formed as a concept. She argues that habit was stripped of
its close association with more mimetic forms of communication1
and became a form of bodily unconscious, encoded beyond
‘verbal-semantic-linguistic representation’. Habit was thus refigured
as having a ‘mechanical-causal basis’ (Leys, 1983: 7), and under-
stood primarily as a materialist concept.
She argues that this led to suggestion being recast as a bodily
automatism, with habit becoming the means of understanding all
those behaviours, forms of action, thought and belief which seemed
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to emanate from and between subjects, beyond their conscious con-
trol or awareness. In a similar way, Camic (1986) argues that habit is
seen as referring to actions which are largely regarded as unmoti-
vated, disclosing a common stereotype of habits as fixed, mechanical
behaviours. One question that both Camic and Leys pose – in differ-
ent ways – in relation to the genealogy of habit within the social
sciences is the extent to which the idea of habit as having a
mechanical-causal basis might be unsettled if we take seriously
genealogies of habit within the psychological sciences, and how dif-
ferent concepts of habit were engaged across philosophy, sociology
and related disciplines. Although habit came to replace mimesis in
Durkheim’s work, and to become primarily understood as a bio-
physical concept primarily located within the nervous system, the
genealogy of habit taking form within both Leys’ and Camic’s work
disrupts this assumption. Both scholars focus on the role the psycho-
logical sciences played in habit’s formation as the locus of
non-intentionality (also see Leys, 2011).
What I want to do in the next section is work through some of these
arguments by locating them specifically within histories of conation
within the psychological sciences, and particularly in the work of
William McDougall, the British social psychologist who was influ-
enced by the work of Gabriel Tarde (see Blackman, 2007). This work
is interesting because it was prior to the formation of habit as having
a causal-mechanical basis, which was to take hold later within
psychology, and prior to the institutionalization of psychology,
sociology and philosophy as distinct disciplines. This will enact one
response to Camic’s (1986) call for habit to be accorded the historical
status it deserves within sociological theorizing. My purpose will be
to open historical reflection up to the hesitations and contestations
articulating concepts of habit, which have crossed the boundaries
between philosophy, psychology and sociology. The implications for
body studies of engaging these debates will be important in theoriz-
ing the affective capacities of bodies.
Habit and Psychology
In a previous article I explored the specific ways in which Gabriel
Tarde’s writings on suggestion and imitation, referred to specifically
in this article as a mimetic paradigm, were engaged, transformed and
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enacted within the emerging disciplinary specialization and profes-
sionalization of social psychology (Blackman, 2007). In this article
I will specifically focus on the work of WilliamMcDougall, as he con-
sistently developed a theory of habit within his work, and also chal-
lenged the increasing mechanization that was taking place within
the psychological sciences at the turn of the 20th century. My rationale
for revitalizing the work of McDougall is strategic and one that is
closely linked to some of the problems within many contemporary
engagements with the sciences by humanities scholars, particularly
within affect theories (see Callard and Papoulias, 2010). Since at least
the revitalization of the work of the American psychologist Silvan
Tomkins by the late cultural theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, psy-
chology and psychological theories and theorists have been offered
up as countering some of the ‘heuristic habits’ (Sedgwick and Frank,
1995: 1) of contemporary critical theory. Sedgwick (Sedgwick and
Frank, 1995: 1) invites cultural theorists to consider Silvan Tomkins
as a theorist whose work challenges what she terms the ‘bipolar tran-
sitive relations’ between subject/object, self/other, nature/culture.
Offering what she terms a ‘rich phenomenology of emotions’ (Sedg-
wick and Frank, 1995: 1), which itself enacts a specific theory of habi-
tuation, Tomkins is heralded as offering the humanities a theory of
affect which counters, at least at the time of Sedgwick’s writing, the
humanities’ focus on representation and discourse. Since Sedgwick’s
interest in Tomkins as someone who was ‘sublimely resistant’2 (Sedg-
wick and Frank, 1995: 7) to core psychological assumptions (such as
the concept of a ‘core personality’), this has opened the door to many
humanities theorists, including the seminal affect theorist, Brian Mas-
sumi (2002), to make bridges with and join alliances with psychology
and related disciplines, such as the contemporary neurosciences.
As Weiss (2008) also shows, key figures central to body stud-
ies, such as Pierre Bourdieu, for example, drew on particular psy-
chological ideas and concepts in their own theories of habit and
the habitus. As she argues, Bourdieu (e.g. 1992) was very influ-
enced by the work of William James, and particularly his theori-
zations of habit within The Principles of Psychology (1890). She
argues that James attempts to resolve the paradoxes of habit as
both resistant and creative in his developmental account of habits
as becoming more and more fixed as the person ages. Although
Bourdieu departs from James, his work was very indebted to
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James, and the problem of plasticity versus fixity is one that is
taken through in his work and the critiques of it, particularly from
more vitalist traditions, such as the work of Deleuze in Difference
and Repetition (1994).
My reasons for revitalizing the work of one key psychologist are
linked not to his particular theories and the usefulness they might
have for contemporary theorizing. Rather, McDougall is a key focus
because his theories enacted some of the hesitations, crossings and
boundary-work enacted between philosophy, science, sociology and
psychology at the turn of the 20th century. I argue that affect theory
has inherited some of these hesitations, and has inadvertently taken
them through in discussions of habit and affect (also see Blackman,
2012). McDougall’s theories of habit were part of a neo-vitalist trend
within psychology, which produced ‘a philosophical basis for a non-
mechanistic, anti-materialist view of life and mind’ (Valentine,
2012b: 82). These views in large part were derived from his interest
in psychic research, which is now being given more prominence in
understanding the fluidity of the boundaries between psychology and
psychical research until at least the early 20th century (see Valentine,
2012b). There was also a strong connection between psychic research
and neo-vitalism, exemplified by the writings of Henri Bergson, Wil-
liam James and Gabriel Tarde, and I will argue that understanding
these connections takes us into the present and the paradox of habit
outlined in the introduction to this article.
William McDougall (1871–1938)
William McDougall has been described by the British philosopher of
science, Graham Richards (2008) as enacting a form of social psy-
chology that seems very unfamiliar and strange when we consider the
heuristic habits of contemporary social psychology. This is despite
the fact that his book, An Introduction to Social Psychology (McDou-
gall, 1910) was the ‘most successful British authored psychology
book every published’ (Richards, 2008: 654). The only other pre-
1910 book that was to reach such heights, Richards (2008: 654)
states, is William James’ Principles of Psychology (1890), which is
probably more familiar to readers than McDougall’s treatise.
McDougall has largely been forgotten but his marginalization should
not be equated with his true significance in contemporary
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understandings of habit, and particularly neo-vitalist traditions which
might enact a strict boundary between philosophy, sociology and
psychology. His work is much richer than the phenomenology of
emotions within the theories of Silvan Tomkins, and he included a
wider range of complex and subtle emotions ‘than most subsequent
psychologists tackle’ (Richards, 2008: 655). There are clear antece-
dents from Tomkins’ to McDougall’s work, but that will be the sub-
ject of another article.
McDougall’s significance in neo-vitalist traditions has undergone
something of a revival in recent writings by historians of psychology
such as Elizabeth Valentine (2012a) and historians interested in the
relationships between psychical research and the psychological
sciences (Asprem, 2010). My own work has also taken an interest
in the archive of theories, concepts and forms of verification and
legitimation enacted across the boundaries of philosophy, psychol-
ogy, literature and science within psychological laboratories at the
turn of the 20th century. This work is interesting for exploring the
antecedents of recent work on the performativity of experimentation
that we might find in the work of Karen Barad (2007), for example,
and which cross art and science in the context of the turn to affect
(Blackman, 2012). These ‘psychological’ archives were transdisci-
plinary, the boundaries between disciplines were fluid and, as
Asprem (2010: 123) argues, McDougall’s theories were character-
ized more by a ‘nice arrangement of heterodoxies’ than by any uni-
fied theory of instinct or habit. What is of interest is what this work
can offer to understandings of mediation, affect and embodiment (see
Blackman, 2012).
McDougall’s career took interesting twists and turns important for
understanding the basis of his theories. He was the president of the
American Society for Psychical Research from 1920 to 1921, having
emigrated to the USA due to his dislike of the English climate. He
was a qualified doctor and practised hypnotism while at Oxford prior
to moving to the USA, and also held a post at University College
London. He was a keen public intellectual, regularly writing for the
press and taking part in radio broadcasts. As Valentine (2012b: 84)
suggests, he crossed the divide between academia and the popular
sphere, illustrating the ‘interplay between the professional and the
popular’. He saw out his career at Duke University, where he set
up the first parapsychology laboratory, which was developed by
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McDougall’s student, Joseph Banks Rhine (1895–1980), who is
credited with founding the contemporary discipline of parapsychol-
ogy (see Asprem, 2010). The focus on McDougall also tells us some-
thing very interesting about the increasing role of psychology within
strategies of governance and regulation as part of its professionaliza-
tion and boundary-making. This takes us beyond simply exploring
McDougall’s theories of habit as a history of ideas or a conceptual
analysis, to explore the role psychology played in histories of the
social as developed in the writings of Nikolas Rose and related per-
spectives (see Henriques et al., 1984).
McDougall, like Gabriel Tarde (1903), was interested in the
concepts of repetition and imitation, and cites Tarde as a central
influence in one of the questions which framed his analyses; of the
‘copying by one individual of the actions, the bodily movements,
of another’ (Tarde, 1903: 102). When we consider McDougall’s
(1910) writings in their historical specificity, we can clearly see that
‘the theory of two factors’ (Despret, 2004: 107) – the idea of nature
and culture as two separate and distinct realms – had not been stabi-
lized within psychology. An engagement with the hesitations, contra-
dictions and paradoxes within psychology offers possibilities of
creative appropriation and reinvention, as well as mapping the
specific governmental trajectories within which habit took form as
a target and object of bio-political strategies.
McDougall’s writings can be situated within the circuits of legiti-
mation, authorization and contestation over what is mutable and
immutable about human and non-human conduct. His articulations
of habit and instinct took form within a context of debate, experimen-
tation and discipline-building which was marked above all by eclec-
ticism, cross-fertilization and a focus on a common range of
experiences and practices which were linked through what were
taken to be their apparent breaches of bodily and mental functions.3
This included a focus on mediumship, telepathy and other forms of
psychical experience, hypnotic induction, the problem of the crowd
and the problem of psychopathology. The latter included a specific
focus on forms of dissociative experience, such as multiple personal-
ity and hysteria. These experiences formed the backdrop to the writ-
ings of philosophers, psychologists and sociologists of the time,
many of whom are currently being revitalized within discussions
of process-ontologies and affect (see Blackman, 2008a, 2010).
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McDougall produced a diverse range of writings which in different
ways developed his originary treatise on social psychology published
in 1910 in his book, An Introduction to Social Psychology. This trea-
tise was developed further in relation to the mind/body problem
(McDougall, 1911), the problem of the crowd or group mind
(1927a), psychopathology (1926), and character and the conduct of
life (1927b), to name a few of his social psychological reflections.
Although associated with developing a ‘theory of instincts’, and thus
being concerned with more materialist conceptions of human life,
this historical framing irons out and covers over the complexities and
hesitations governing his own theories and concepts. This is no more
so than when we look to McDougall’s theories of instinct, their
indebtedness to the work of Gabriel Tarde (1903) and the concomi-
tant place of habit within these formulations.
How Do the Many Act as One?
Tarde (1903), according to Jones and Gerard (1967), was interested
in cultural and statistical regularity expressed through a notion of
habit, which referred to those mechanisms through which uniformity
within a particular culture (observed through dress and manners, for
example) was spread. The notion of habit was not a psychological
disposition, but the means through which innovation might transmit
through a kind of imitative rapidity; what he termed ‘invention
through following’ (Toews, 2003: 85). This ‘radical symmetry
among all items in the field of social action, including persons and
objects’ (2003: 83) was not due to the triumph of will or the volition
of human or non-human actors. It is better described as due to inven-
tion and the coming together of elements (for example, customs) in a
manner of resemblance due to repetition. As we can see, the paradox
of habit is central to Tarde’s theories, with habit referring to custom,
sedimentation, discipline through repetition, as well as providing the
conditions of possibility for the new, creativity and innovation (see
Barry and Thrift, 2007). Transported to a more contemporary hori-
zon, Tarde is credited with the development of ‘an affect-based
collective phenomenon’ or a ‘socio-psychic account of contagion’
(Toews, 2003: 92).
Tarde proposed two main mechanisms for explaining contagious
communication; invention and imitation. Invention as a concept
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enabled Tarde to link a notion of genius – ‘a spark of originality’
(FPS, 1909: 328) – with the propagation of ideas by particular indi-
viduals. These were individuals who were authorized to speak and
credited with social prestige, as well as expressing a particular biolo-
gical imperative. Although Tarde, as Latour (2004: 120) argues, was
a champion of the idea of the network, exploring how patterns or reg-
ularities were ‘assemblages of many interlocking monads’, what has
been given less attention is the ‘fit’ or compatibility of his ideas with
Darwinism. Latour (2004: 128) does describe Tarde’s monadology
as a ‘brand of metaphysical Darwinism’, but does not give adequate
detail of the ways in which particular evolutionary ideas from psy-
chology were being assembled within his account (see Blackman,
2007). The question of the spread of ideas through imitation and
routinized through habit and custom was an attempt to combine
selection and creation. In relation to this Tarde also turned to the
work of the eugenicist, Francis Galton (1892), and particularly his
treatise on Hereditary Genius. This enabled him to link invention
with variation in ability or genius, which was seen to provide the fer-
tile soil from which great ideas would spring forth.
Galton produced an ‘architecture of the primitive’ (Bennett,
2010), which reflected his own eugenics thinking; races and classes
were ranked in a developmental hierarchy from the so-called higher
to the lower. This typology combined a set of fears about the threat
of different races/classes to the nation’s intelligence (particularly in
relation to the declining birth rate of the middle classes) with an
idea of merit or value (social worth). Of course, Tarde was a prod-
uct of his time, and Social Darwinism was increasingly put forward
in eugenics strategies as the means, at the end of the 19th century, to
relieve the problems of unemployment, poverty and conditions of
life, such as the problem of madness, and its amelioration through
the emerging sciences of psychiatry and psychology (Blackman,
2001; Castell, 1988; Donnelly, 1983; Gordon, 1992; Rose, 1985).
Tarde also drew on neurological conceptions of the time, which
presented the brain as having a plasticity: as ‘an organ for repeating
and multiplying the nervous disturbances transmitted to it at any
point of its substance, and thence radiating in all directions’ (FPS,
1909: 145). This plasticity was seen to become more and more fixed
over time, linked to neurological understandings of reflex path-
ways, which can also be found in William James’ accounts of habit
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(see Weiss, 2008). Thus functional flexibility was overlaid with the
imposition of limits.
These limits were those set by the inherited or constitutional stock
of the individual, which were specified through emerging ideas from
evolutionary biology. Thus both invention and imitation could be
hindered by ability, which was used as a concept to explain which
ideas/practices tended to spread, from whom to whom. ‘If an inven-
tion requires higher capacity than the people can produce, according
to their own scale of variation, that people will never make such an
invention’ (Tarde, 1903: 169). It is this aspect of Tarde’s theories that
were felt to be the least adequately developed at the time of his writ-
ing (1903: 134), and which led McDougall (1910) both to cite Tarde
as an influence on his particular brand of social psychology, and also
to develop this through his ‘instinctual approach’ to the basis of
human life. Thus, for McDougall (1910: 342) imitation tends to
spread ‘from upper to middle classes’ and is linked to a civilizing
ethos. He cites the imitation of western Europe by Japan as an exem-
plar of ‘the imitation of one people by another’, which, he argued,
‘has been a principal condition of the progress of civilisation’
(1910: 339).
McDougall argued that it was not possible to address the problem
of socialization, as it came to be known within social psychology
(see Henriques et al., 1984), without developing a theory of the
kinds of motivational impulses which drive people towards certain
forms of action or conduct, rather than others. He situated himself
both in relation to and in opposition to moral philosophy and
theories of the moral faculty or sentiment. He was also critical of
what he saw as the replacement of this pre-psychological realm
with a notion of will, which, as Sedgwick (1994: 134) notes, in the
19th century was increasingly used to refer to an ‘absolutized space
of pure voluntarity’. Importantly, he also increasingly positioned
his work as a counter to the rise of mechanist psychology, which
reduced human conduct and behaviour to the brain, understood
through concepts located within physiology, physics and chemistry
(McDougall, 1911). Copying or imitation was not a mechanical
process, and in this respect McDougall’s theories were more influ-
enced by ideas of hypnotic suggestion, telepathy and modes of
transmission understood and enacted within psychic research of
the time.
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Suggestion and the telepathic idea of ‘action at a distance’ invoked
the possibility of non-conscious or trans-conscious motivation; of
how people might be compelled to act in ways which by-pass con-
scious control and reflection. However, suggestion and telepathy also
operated according to thresholds of possibility, raising the question
of how to understand the mediation of suggestive processes (see
Blackman, 2012). One popular response to this problematic was to
be found in the writings of Gustave Le Bon (1922), a French Royal-
ist, who aligned suggestion to degeneracy (see Blackman, 2012).
McDougall’s theories were a concatenation of these disparate ele-
ments brought together in relation to what he termed the problem
of disposition (McDougall, 1911: 19). This concept brought together
what he termed ‘two lines of scientific study [which] have seemed
entirely distinct and perhaps even opposed in spirit’ (McDougall,
1922: 58–9, quoted in Asprem, 2010: 136) – psychical research and
eugenics. The apparent contradictions between materialism and anti-
materialist concepts are integral to his study of habit and instincts
(McDougall, 1911: 19), which he defined as the ‘essential springs
or motive powers of all thought and action’. Although McDougall
is often credited with championing nature, his account weaves
together nature and nurture in ways which are an interesting precur-
sor to contemporary theories of affect in social theory, and particu-
larly those which draw from the work of the American
psychologist, Silvan Tomkins (see Gibbs, 2008; Sedgwick, 2003).4
In McDougall’s reflections on the mind/body problem (more usu-
ally referred to as the psycho-physical problem), the close relation-
ship of habit to neo-vitalism and psychic research is clearly visible
(McDougall, 1911). The book, Body and Mind (2011: viii) sets itself
up as a critical survey of the history of animism: the idea that all
natural objects are moved by spirits or what McDougall preferred
to refer to as ‘an animating principle’. This book was positioned as
a counter to the increasing predominance of mechanism and materi-
alism within psychology (specifically the work of Alexander Bain
and Herbert Spencer), and as performing a dialogue with subliminal
psychology.5 One of the specific background debates that McDou-
gall was engaging was the work of Frederic Myers (1904), who
argued that human personality is not wholly destroyed by death (see
Blackman, 2008a, 2010, for more detail). Luckhurst (2002) argues in
the conclusion to his genealogy of telepathy that the claim that the
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personality could survive death was one that pushed telepathy to the
periphery, taking up residency within the psychological sciences as
a marginalized sub-discipline, parapsychology,6 rationalized under
a newly emerging concept of ESP (extra-sensory perception). The
shift of telepathy to the margins is hugely important for understand-
ing what is being missed in contemporary understandings of
habit and the oppositional accounts which tend to characterize its
afterlife.
In McDougall’s engagement with these debates, he rejected the
assumption contained within mechanistic psychology that the
physico-chemical constitution of the nervous system can explain
the ‘actions of man’ (1911: 112). As well as an engagement with
Bergson’s (1911) arguments in Matter and Memory, which chal-
lenged the assumption within mechanistic paradigms that memory
can be equated to habit (as a reflex action aligned to repetition), he
took seriously the empirical evidence that had been amassed by the
Society for Psychical Research that ‘human personality may and
does survive in some sense and degree the death of the body’
(1911: 347). He was adamant that the evidence that had been estab-
lished could not be understood by mechanism or parallelism (the idea
that there is a strict parallel between psychic processes and physical
processes in the brain), and that this research pointed towards a more
telepathic concept of transmission. Thus mimetic forms of communi-
cation were seen to underlie such diverse phenomena as hypnotic
trance, pure memory (in the Bergsonian sense), personality, stigmata,
automatic writing, double-personality and so forth.
His concept of the psycho-physical incorporates this concept of
affective or telepathic transfer such that both instincts and habits
retain their lineage with neo-vitalist and psychic, or what I will term
trans-subjective ontologies of personhood, while also allowing an
engagement with Lamarckian and Darwinian conceptions of evolu-
tion and development. The latter were to become increasingly predo-
minant across the psychological and biological sciences (see Venn,
1984) and were to become central to the ways in which psychological
ideas and concepts influenced how habits were conceptualized and
targeted, particularly within educational practices.
Perhaps one of the best examples of the aligning of habit with dis-
cipline, training, exercise and education within the psychological
sciences, and its incorporation within specific liberal strategies of
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governmentality, is the place of habit within discussions of adoles-
cence. This is to be found in the work of the eugenicist and psychol-
ogist, Stanley Hall. Hall’s book, Adolescence: Its Psychology, and
its Relationships to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime,
Religion and Education (1904), is associated with the invention of
adolescence as a distinct stage of development. The book is very much
a eugenics handbook, which makes links between the development of
rhythm in adolescence and evolutionary arguments about primitivism
and its link to different stages of evolutionary development. Hall was
part of a colonial and imperialist project which saw psychology as
being one of the key knowledge practices for identifying and mapping
degeneracy. His book offered ways of correcting and rehabilitating
various problems of social existence that were seen to ensue from this,
including vice, criminality and delinquency. It is in the following
quotes that we can clearly see the links being made between the colo-
nial subject, the adolescent and rhythm:
Most savages in most respects are children, or, because of sexual
maturity, more properly, adolescents of adult size. (1904: 649) the
child and the race are each keys to the other. (1904: viii) Adolescence
is the golden period of nascency for rhythm. (1904: 212)
Hall’s project was to diagnose and ‘arrest’ what was framed as ‘retar-
dation’ in both the individual and the race, which was aligned to vice,
delinquency, criminality, prostitution and psychopathology. What
was important in this project was the disciplining of rhythms: this
was to be done through the inculcation of habit in the form of partic-
ular drills, instruction and forms of training. This included, for boys,
industrial training, manual training, gymnastics, military training,
cold baths and swimming, marching, rowing, football, baseball,
tug-of-war, tennis and youth groups such as the Scouts (see particu-
larly the founding of the Salford Lads Club in the early 1900s in the
UK, which targeted young working-class boys and incorporated
these principles in its vision). Girls were seen to have a different con-
stitution that afforded rather different forms of training and discipline
to suit their nature. These included: sewing, knitting, crocheting,
weaving, ballet, outdoor walks and games, regular sleep, religion,
Girl Guides groups and particular forms of education seen to be more
suited to their physical and psychic constitution.
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These arguments were made in the context of what many scholars
have referred to as an emergent ‘machinic’ rhythm of life. This was
characterized by the sound and flow of mechanical rhythms which
represented an accelerated and speeded up tempo of life, which could
also be repetitive and/or noisy (i.e. factory machines, transport
machines, etc.). This was aligned to industrialization and Fordist
modes of mass production driven by what Dinerstein (2003: 9) refers
to as a ‘quest for continuous, efficient, flowing, forward motion’.
This machine aesthetic was characterized by modalities of kinaes-
thetic expression and movement that were governed by ‘power,
speed, repetition, precision, efficiency [and] rhythmic flow’ (2003:
12). Robert Levine (1997) refers to this felt experience, especially
of city life as having a particular tempo. The so-called ‘New York
minute’ in the 1930s has also been characterized by some as a
‘machine aesthetic’, found in some forms of music, particularly jazz
and swing, and the stylizing of mechanical repetition particularly
aligned to African-American jazz (see Dinerstein, 2003). Big-band
swing music by African-American musicians such as Louis Arm-
strong and Duke Ellington, which was America’s most popular music
in the 1930s, and the Lindy Hop, a particular form of swing dance,
were both seen as getting-with the rhythm of machines.
An interesting term that was part of this machine aesthetic was the
term ‘grooving’ – which referred to the bonding performed and
enacted through these cultural forms and traditions, which amplified,
modulated and augmented particular rhythmic affects to bind people
together. As Dinerstein (2003: 16) says, ‘it is not enough to hear the
groove; you must be drawn inside it, and it must penetrate to your
inner core’. The focus on grooving, in this case given a positive
value, takes a rather different form when we turn to other traditions,
practices, objects, people and entities which were connected up
through rhythmic forms of communication. This includes those that
we find within more fascist ideologies such as National Socialist
ideology.
This has been the subject of the much-marginalized discipline of
mass psychology, particularly aligned to the work of Serge Moscov-
ici (1985; also see Blackman, 2012, for more detail). Appeals to rea-
son and rationality, didactic command and instruction, and staged
forms of persuasion would miss the mark, and even make followers
more resistant to change and transformation. What were needed were
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appeals to the heart, to feeling, to passion, to the imagination; to a
realm of affect which was co-present with the psychic and emotional
rather than the intellect and reasoning. Moscovici (1985: 139)
characterizes these appeals as creating an ‘illusion of love’ through
the use of a range of techniques – affective, bodily and psychological
– designed to maximize and facilitate processes of suggestion and
imitation. These might include the use of symbols, flags, images,
singing, music, affirmations, phrases, speeches and slogans. These
would be delivered through the hypnotizing use of repetition, rather
than didactic command and instruction. Individuals would be
touched in ways which might be non-conscious or create the feeling
that they are the originator of the feeling, rather than simply mechani-
cally reproducing the beliefs of a charismatic other. These techniques
propagated and orchestrated rhythm in particular ways, which were
seen as crucial to the government and regulation of populations.
Work on the rhythmic dimensions of affective communication in
this way has focused on the felt dimension of such practices – which
might include military drill, synchronized forms of dance, practices
such as Tai Chi, swimming, etc. – and the way that they literally feel
good (see Blackman, 2008b; McNeil, 1995). So we can see from the
way rhythm was articulated and enacted within early psychology,
particularly in the work of Hall, that rhythm was associated with a
lack of self-control understood within a primitivist discourse.
Rhythms were to be disciplined through particular forms of training
and habit. We can start to see the way rhythms are considered
entangled processes that disclose the creativity of habit, as well as the
aligning of habit to training, exercise, discipline and regulation.
McDougall’s work is interesting because, although Lamarckian
concepts of evolution were integral to his account, habits could not
simply be located within the psycho-physical constitution of the indi-
vidual, class or race. Instincts and habits are always ‘organised in
systems of increasing complexity’ (1911: 17), but are often per-
formed without deliberate action. The invocation of forms of action
which might be enacted without conscious reflection and driven by a
motivational force brought together Lamarckian theories of evolu-
tion with psychic research and neo-vitalism. Habits were patterns and
regularities of behaviour, motor skills, reflex actions and responses
that were engrained within a kind of bodily memory. However,
although these forms of bodily memory lay outside of the subject’s
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conscious reflections and deliberations, the accomplishment or per-
formance of the involuntary was a complex psycho-physical process
which involved the cognitive, the affective and the conative; the co-
constitution of knowing, feeling and intention.
‘Conation’ is a term which is taken to refer to the motivational
aspects of behaviour; that which is seen to propel us towards certain
kinds of action. Conation within psychology has largely been forgot-
ten within studies of habit (see Blackman, 2012). What has been
emphasized is what has come to be seen as the non-intentional
aspects of habit and the separation of both affect and habit from cog-
nition and conation (see Leys, 2011). When we look at the history of
conation within the psychological sciences the complexity of how to
think habit becomes apparent (see Huitt, 1999).
McDougall used the concept of conation to refer to the intentional
aspects of behaviour, including possible psychic motivations, seeing
the cognitive, affective and conative as co-constitutive processes.
However, increasingly, and throughout McDougall’s body of work,
what became emphasized was the importance of conscious delibera-
tion. Intentional aspects of habit were recast as conscious, rational,
cognitive processes, allowing for a separation between habit and cog-
nition and affect and cognition that we find in recent work on affect,
and which became increasingly central to psychological knowledge
and practices. The transformation of habit has to be understood by
recourse to the increasing dominance of the will within the psycho-
logical sciences (see Smith, 1992), which was to fundamentally
re-arrange the heterogeneity of the elements, psychic research,
neo-vitalism, eugenics and Lamarckian evolution which underpinned
McDougall’s theorizing (see Asprem, 2010).
The Group Mind
The circuits of legitimation, authorization and contestation between
McDougall and some of his close interlocutors, including William
James,7 Henri Bergson and Pierre Janet, reveal the close relationship
of habit to neo-vitalism and psychic research, and the important rela-
tional and affective dimensions of this concept that have largely
become obscured or produced as oppositional theories within contem-
porary accounts. In McDougall’s application of his treatise to the prob-
lem of the ‘group mind’ (1927a) we can see more clearly his lament at
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being characterized as being on the side of nature or materialism (the
supposed instinctual basis of human life), and also ground more visibly
the common experiences that were forming the basis and stimulating
the work of his key interlocutors, Tarde, Janet and Bergson.
It is worth setting the context for this work as it was written after the
First World War and also following McDougall’s five-year military
service considering ‘the practical problems of psychotherapy’
(1927a: viii). McDougall sets the application of his particular princi-
ples of social psychology in contrast to the ‘strictly individual psychol-
ogy of the laboratories’ (1927a: xv). This was clearly a nod towards
the work of Wundt and the kind of abstracted psychology which
treated human subjects as monads, ‘as self-contained and complete
in themselves’ rather than as ‘merely nodes or meeting points of all
the forces of the world acting and reacting in unlimited time and
space’ (1927a: xv). This more relational ontology was framed in
relation to one of the key problematics that structured the book.
This saw affective transfer or telepathic transfer as being a normal
condition of human and even animal communication. McDougall
linked this to what he saw as the overwhelming evidence from stud-
ies of crowd psychology, psychic research and subliminal psychol-
ogy, that thoughts, beliefs, affects, desires and emotions could be
transmitted between individual minds other than through what were
recognized as the normal channels of sense-perception and bodily
movement (see 1927a: 9). The theme of the book concerned the
question of how knowledge of these processes could be useful for
liberal forms of governmentality.
McDougall proposed two explanations to understand collective
consciousness and the constitution of collective mental life that
should be given serious consideration: telepathy and suggestibility.
McDougall reserved judgement on telepathy, but, like many of his
contemporaries, he felt that the evidence pointed towards forms of
‘action at a distance’ that in the future would be further evidenced
and understood (also see Blackman, 2010). Suggestibility was
reserved for what were described as ‘simple’ or unorganized crowds,
rather than the complex forms of organization that were character-
ized by military life and the army for example. The crowd or mob
became the prototypical example of retrogression and primitivism,
where suggestibility became a concept for explaining such reversion,
which was aligned to irrationality and animality. Consider
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McDougall’s description of the crowd, written in the context of
understanding the riots in the Paris Communes in the 1890s:
it is excessively emotional, impulsive, violent, fickle, inconsistent,
irresolute and extreme in action, displaying only the coarser emotions
and the less refined sentiments, extremely suggestible, careless in
deliberation, hasty in judgement, incapable of any but the simpler and
imperfect forms of reasoning. (1927a: 45)
Suggestibility was mapped onto an emerging instinctual economy
that aligned the instincts with behaviour, thought and feeling consid-
ered automatic and involuntary (Foucault, 2003). This voluntary/
involuntary axis was mapped onto a distinction between the primitive
and civilized that was central to evolutionary theories of degeneracy
prominent at the turn of the 20th century (Darwin, 1859). The appar-
ent psychopathology of crowd behaviour mobilized by McDougall
and others, such as Le Bon, aligned the crowd with ‘an array of
pathologized ‘‘others’’ – neurotic, feminine, ‘‘primitive’’, and racia-
lized others, the mass of working classes and the poor’ (Orr, 2006:
42). As McDougall argued, ‘its behaviour is like that of an unruly
child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation, and
in the worse cases it is like that of a wild beast’ (1927a: 45).
With suggestibility re-articulated within an ‘architecture of the pri-
mitive’ (Bennett, 2010), McDougall revisited his ‘theory of the
instincts’ to provide his own account of transmission. This was not sim-
ply a theory of biological drives but rather an account of how instincts
could be organized within increasing systems of complexity such that
they would take on acquired characteristics or habits. The motivational
energy would come from the instinctual impulse that could become
intensified such that, although it might be experienced as involuntary
or automatic, it is nevertheless modulated through what McDougall
termed ‘sympathetic induction’ (1927a: 27). The concept of sympa-
thetic induction allowed McDougall to retain his focus on the distribu-
tional economies characteristic of his intimate instinct/habit pairing, but
also to introduce a mimetic conception of transmission found in both
telepathy and suggestion. This allowed him to account for inter-
psychological processes or what he termed collective mental life. This
was a way of accounting for the kinds of telepathic rapport which he
believed, following the work of BinghamNewland (1916), in his book,
What is Instinct? SomeThoughts on Telepathy and Subconsciousness in
Blackman 205
Animals, could also be found between animals of the same species (see
Blackman, 2012, for a discussion of Bingham Newland’s writings).
The kinds of foresight and sensing that might be found among
insects, moths, flies, birds and fish (all the subjects of Newland’s
book) were evidence of the basis of instinctual behaviour within tele-
pathic processes such as teleaesthesia.8 In other words, instincts were
not simply hard-wired biological drives, to be understood by physiol-
ogy, but represented complex systems of communication or affective
transfer, which were shared, transmitted and co-constituted between
members of species. McDougall extended this understanding to his
concept of character, retaining Tarde’s focus on imitation but also
allowing a concept of ‘innate constitution’ to become integrated into
his account of the development of national as opposed to collective
life (1927a: 110). This allowed him to make differentiations between
nations based on eugenic hierarchizations in order to make pro-
nouncements about the so-called civilizing ethos of countries such
as England, which, in his eyes, had not fully considered the concep-
tual basis of their over-zealous imperial practices.9 McDougall
argued that customs, beliefs, institutions and language evolve
through the mechanisms and mediation of imitation, but that ‘such
general imitation will only take place when the cultural element in
question is more or less congenial to the innate qualities of the bulk
of individuals’ (1927a: 110).
The Future of Habit
Given the heterogeneous elements that make up McDougall’s theoriz-
ing of habit and instinct, and the close concatenation of neo-vitalism,
psychic research and eugenics in this work, how did psychological the-
ories of habit become aligned with mechanism to later be dismissed as
having nothing to offer sociological and philosophical theories of
habit? What paved the way for mechanistic and materialist concep-
tions of human and non-human conduct and behaviour to be taken
up within liberal strategies of governmentality? In order to understand
the histories of the concept of habit, we need to look outside McDou-
gall’s work and consider the increasing specialization of psychological
knowledge and its uptake within emerging strategies of governance
and regulation. As we have already seen, when we follow habit’s fate
within education, evolutionary concepts – which psychology had
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already helped to shape and augment – had taken up a central place
within eugenics strategies. Although interest in telepathy and neo-
vitalism was integral to psychology, particularly increasing after the
First World War with the massive scale of loss and bereavement that
people were suffering, in 1930 membership of the Society for Psychi-
cal Research halved (see Valentine, 2012b). Psychology was in a state
of transition and was increasingly to exclude telepathy and psychic
research from its legitimate subject matter. Telepathy had increasingly
become associated with the occult and spiritualism, and the professio-
nalization of psychology, central to its boundary-making, was focused
upon its increasing role in offering practical advice and guidance,
building upon the ‘interplay between the professional and popular’
(Valentine, 2012b: 84). We can clearly see this in the transformation
of McDougall’s writing and the increasing role he played in popular
broadcasting and ‘courting public appeal’ (Valentine, 2012b: 84).
In a book first published in 1927, Character and the Conduct of
Life (1927b), the traces of neo-vitalism and psychic research within
McDougall’s concept of habit and instinct seem to have been lost.
Discussions of telepathy, the survival of the personality after death,
hypnosis and allied phenomena have gone. What we are left with
is a book set up in the Sophist tradition of offering practical advice
and guidance on the art of living. This book is part of the beginning
of what sociologists such as Nikolas Rose (1985, 1989, 1996) have
identified as the emergence and taking-form of liberal forms of per-
sonhood within the psychological sciences. McDougall’s concept of
‘human nature’ focuses specifically on what is taken to be inborn
about personhood, and how this can be cultivated and intensified
through exercise, training, discipline and practice. The vestiges of
neo-vitalism and psychic research can be identified in two ways: the
aligning of impulses or instinctual energies with some kind of vital
energy; what McDougall terms a ‘common stock of vital energy,
an energy which, call it what we will, ‘‘elan vital’’, or libido, or
will-to-live’ (1927b: 25) forms the motivational impulse towards
action. What also remains is a concept of ‘emotional contagion’, the
idea that the development of character, for example, is sensitive to
the kinds of atmosphere or affective dynamics created by parental
relations that a child will attune to for better or worse. The translation
of transmission into contagion is contained within McDougall’s dis-
cussion of the relationship between character and happiness. This is
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an inter-psychology that focuses on what might be passed between
people through the registers of affect, emotion and feeling, but which
obscures the more telepathic concept of transfer contained within his
earlier work:
It is generally agreed that it is reasonable and right to desire to be
happy; that we ought to be happy if we can, not only because happi-
ness is a desirable state of mind in itself, but also because it diffuses
itself, tending by simple contagion to make happier those with whom
we come into contact. (1927b: 105)
McDougall’s attention in this book shifts – and this is significant
for my argument – to new key interlocutors. What demands
McDougall’s energy is no longer subliminal psychology, which
as we have seen gradually became marginalized within psychol-
ogy (see Luckhurst, 2002), the Society for Psychical Research
or discussions of hypnosis. Rather, the writings of Freud charac-
terized as the ‘New Psychology’ (McDougall, 1927b: 39), the
writings of William James and Darwinism provide the dialogic
conditions for his articulations of character and conduct. I do not
have the space to engage with the way in which Freud translated
telepathy and suggestion within his formulations of transference
(see Campbell, 2009; Chertok and Stengers, 1992), but what we
can clearly see in this later account is a modification of his con-
cepts of habit and instinct which take into account the increasing
naturalization of the concept of will or inhibition (see Smith,
1992). This sits alongside his commitment to process ontologies
(James and Bergson) rather than reifying the human mind as a
thing or entity (McDougall, 1927b: 39).
What remains is a paradox, where habits are both the site of change
and movement, as well as incorporating the potential for bodily
forms of fixity, continuity and stability. What does change, however,
is the impulsive potency or power accorded to habit. In earlier
accounts instincts and habits share an impulse to action, which is fur-
ther extended through the modification of instincts as habits. How-
ever, in this later account, habits lose their motivational energy,
which arguably corresponds to their new aligning with and modifica-
tion by will power. As McDougall states: ‘The habits are only instru-
ments, which subserve our purposes, but do not determine them’
(1927b: 181). For McDougall, human behaviour and conduct is
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intentional, anticipatory and purposive. Habit, instinct, memory and
related concepts were to take up a reconfigured set of relationships
within this newly emerging, liberal and increasingly neoliberal arts
of living.
Conclusion
Ruth Leys (2011) has recently argued for the importance of genealogy
to understand the way in which habit and affect have come to be
aligned with non-intentionality, particularly within contemporary
affect theory. The psychological and neurosciences have become pri-
vileged knowledge practices for further specifying the nature and lim-
its of non-intentionality (see Callard and Papoulias, 2010). This is
often described as a materialist process approach to embodiment,
which relies on particular psychological and neuro-psychological con-
cepts in order to understand affective transmission (see Blackman,
2012). Habit, as a form of bodily memory, is one such concept, aligned
specifically to the action of the nervous system in accounts of affect
contagion. I hope that this partial genealogy of habit as it took form
within social psychology complicates the easy alignment of habit and
affect with non-intentionality, and reveals the complex place of psy-
chological forms of knowledge and experimentation in theorizing the
body’s potential for mediation. The hesitations, contradictions and
dilemmas governing the psychological sciences lie in the background
of the paradoxes which govern contemporary understandings of habit.
I hope that the partial genealogical reflections presented in this
article broaden our understanding of the paradoxes of habit, where
if habit retains its lineage with mimesis, this allows us to better
understand its unique position in affect modulation, which encom-
passes regulation (in the form of discipline) and also extends its
potential for engaging the new, change and creativity (Grosz,
2004). This perhaps exposes the paradox of habit, where we are both
open to influence but not continually confronting the world anew.
However, any ontological reflections made in this way must also
recognize the place of habit within a habit–instinct–memory–sugges-
tion axis that played a primary role in what Bennett (2010) terms an
‘architecture of the primitive’. It was this architecture of personhood
that was increasingly to take form within already emerging liberal
governmental traditions, in which psychology was to play a key role.
Blackman 209
Notes
1. Mimetic forms of communication have been characterized in the
recent work of Anna Gibbs (2010: 186) as ‘corporeally based
forms of communication, both voluntary and involuntary’. She
links mimesis to contemporary work on affect and draws primar-
ily from infant research. Ruth Leys (1983) focuses specifically on
practices such as hypnotic suggestion in the context of work on
trauma to explore mimesis. My own recent work extends this
focus on mimesis to explore the connections between telepathy,
suggestion, voice hearing and related phenomena in what I term
a ‘subliminal archive’ at the turn of the last century (see Black-
man, 2012).
2. Sedgwick and Frank (1995: 24) describe Tomkins as ‘a discipli-
narily excessive figure in Psychology’.
3. Gabriel Tarde and Le Bon crossed disciplinary demarcations
between psychology and sociology, which were still very much
in their infancy. Apfelbaum and McGuire (1986: 33) show how
the lack of specialization which characterized the work of both
authors enabled them to produce treatises on subjects as diverse
as ‘tobacco, Arabian civilization, photography, socialism, educa-
tion, and military psychology . . . geography, archaeology, futur-
ology and poetry’. Similarly Moscovici (1985) and Barrows
(1981) both argue that the so-called laws of human behaviour
which both Tarde and Le Bon were attempting to map, was very
much an interdisciplinary venture, with both authors writing on a
range of eclectic subjects which could not be subsumed by either
social psychology or sociology.
4. See the dialogue and exchange in the journal Critical Inquiry
between Ruth Leys, an American historian of science, and affect
theorists, specifically William Connolly, Elizabeth Wilson and
Adam Frank, which originate from and respond to Ruth Leys’
(2011) critique of Affect Theory published in the journal.
5. Subliminal psychology was characterized particularly by the writ-
ings of Boris Sidis (1898), Frederic Myers (1904), William James
(1890) and Pierre Janet (1907), who all subscribed to the idea that
consciousness was not housed within the individual mind or brain,
but rather that individual minds were receptors or transmitters of
more collective forms of consciousness, which existed and
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extended beyond the human body. Subliminal psychology
spanned an interest in dynamic psychology and psychopathology
(particularly multiple personality and hysteria), telepathy and psy-
chical research, hypnotic trance, suggestion and crowd psychol-
ogy (see Blackman, 2010, for a discussion of subliminal
psychology in relation to current debates on affect and vitalism
across the humanities).
6. Parapsychology is now more commonly known within the psy-
chological sciences as the psychology of anomalous experience
and aligns a diverse range of phenomena and experiences; includ-
ing mediumship, electronic voice phenomena, magical beliefs,
lucid dreaming, death-bed visions, miracle cures, paranormal
beliefs, false memory, telepathy, near-death states, haunted
experiences, hypnosis, the placebo effect and so forth. It is
framed as a study of extraordinary or exceptional phenomena,
but is not restricted to those which might be delineated as para-
normal. These phenomena are often framed and constituted
through the neuro and cognitive psychology of perception and
belief.
7. McDougall dedicated his 1923 book, An Outline of Psychology, to
William James, with the following inscription: to ‘The Honoured
Memory of William James, Great Philosopher, Great Psycholo-
gist, and Great Man’. James was a continual inspiration for
McDougall, who saw his own ‘purposive psychology’ (as out-
lined in this book) as having a very close relationship to James’s
pragmatic philosophy.
8. Teleaesthesia was defined as ‘perception at a distance or power of
vision transcending time and space’ (Newland, 1916: 189).
9. It was the ignoring of the importance of race and the over-
estimation of the moulding influence of culture and institutions,
eloquently voiced by Lord Macaulay, that led England some eighty
years ago to set out on the task of endowing the millions of India
with British culture and institutions. (McDougall, 1927a: 101)
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